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In February 2003, the SEC officially certified a fourth credit rating agency, Dominion Bond Rating
Service (“DBRS”), for use in bond investment regulations.  After DBRS certification, bond yields
change in the direction implied by the firm’s DBRS rating relative to its ratings from other certified
rating agencies.  A one notch better DBRS rating corresponds to a 39 basis point reduction in a firm’s
debt cost of capital.  The impact on yields is driven by cases where the DBRS rating is better than
other ratings and is larger among bonds rated near the investment-grade cutoff.  These findings indicate
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Credit rating agencies play a central role in financial markets.  Previous studies examine 
whether credit ratings affect yields on a firm’s bonds due to the information ratings impart 
about default risk.  Ratings may also affect bond yields because regulations affect the kinds of 
investors able to hold a firm’s bonds or the cost of holding a bond.  Relying on an exogenous 
change in the regulatory status of a particular rating agency, this paper shows that ratings-
based regulations of bond investment affect the cost of debt.  We also examine how 
regulatory status subsequently affects a rating agency’s rating decisions. 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) designates certain rating agencies as 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (“NRSRO(s)”), certifying these 
agencies as qualified for implementation of various kinds of regulations.  Numerous 
institutions and regulatory bodies rely on ratings from NRSROs for bond investment rules and 
regulations.  These regulations, for example, link the number of institutional investors who 
may hold bonds (or their capital requirements) to ratings of those bonds granted by an 
NRSRO (see Kisgen (2006) and Section I.A below for more details).  As of January 2003, 
Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch were the only NRSROs, but in February 2003 the 
SEC designated Toronto-based Dominion Bond Rating Service (“DBRS”) as a fourth 
NRSRO.  We exploit this unexpected change in DBRS’s regulatory status as a quasi-natural 
experiment to test how ratings can affect bond yields, not merely as a proxy for information 
but directly through their impact on regulatory enforcement.   
 
We first document that the change in DBRS’s status affected yields on the bonds they rate.  
Firms DBRS rates better than the other NRSROs as of January 2003 experience a decline in 
their cost of debt after February 2003.  By the end of 2003 these firms had experienced a 39   2 
 
basis point drop in bond yields compared to firms whose DBRS ratings were the same as the 
average of the other agencies.  To avoid potential selection bias, we consider only bonds rated 
by DBRS prior to their obtaining NRSRO status.  By holding the ratings fixed as of January 
of 2003, we rule out information-based explanations for the change in yields; since the ratings 
do not change over time, new information can not explain the change in yields.  These tests 
indicate that the change in regulatory status of DBRS changed the impact of its ratings on a 
firm’s bond yields. 
 
While our tests rule out changes in information affecting yields, it may be that NRSRO status 
itself increases the value of DBRS ratings after February or 2003.  Perhaps SEC certification 
enhances DBRS’ reputation, thereby increasing the credibility of its ratings in the market, 
even if those ratings do not change.  Prior to 2003, DBRS was not a well-established rating 
agency.  Several rating agencies petitioned the SEC for NRSRO status, but only DBRS was 
granted the accreditation.  This vetting out process may indicate that DBRS ratings are higher 
quality, and thus financial markets may consider ratings provided by DBRS as more 
informative after February 2003. 
 
To rule out certification, we conduct three additional tests.  First, we show that the effect of 
the change in DBRS’s regulatory status affects yields only when they rate a firm better than 
the other agencies; when the DBRS rating is worse, the cost of capital does not increase.   
Certification following promotion to NRSRO would imply a symmetric effect on yields.  In 
contrast, the regulatory explanation implies that better ratings would affect bond yields 
because many of the regulations link investment constraints to the best of the NRSRO ratings 
(or sometimes the second best).  Second, the effect on yields is stronger around the   3 
 
investment-grade boundary, where regulations based on ratings are most prevalent and 
significant.  The consequence for an issuer losing its investment grade, for example, can be 
substantial.  When S&P downgraded General Motors to speculative grade, their bonds fell 
8%, and at least one reason provided was that the “downgrade has sent institutions running for 
the exits…many [of them] have rules that prohibit them from owning non-investment grade 
debt” (Forbes, 2005).  We find that firms with better DBRS ratings around the investment 
grade cutoff see a reduction in their debt cost of capital of approximately 54 basis points.  
While we have no direct data on bond holdings, we believe this decline occurs because more 
investors can hold these bonds, leading gradually to a decline in their yields.  Third, we 
conduct two falsification tests, incorrectly assuming that a change in regulatory status 
occurred in February 2004 or February 2005.  Conducting the same experiments with these 
alternate dates does not generate any of the results we find for the actual event date.  We 
conclude from this additional evidence that credit ratings affect a firm’s cost of capital 
specifically due to regulations based on ratings. 
 
Having established our main finding, we next test whether DBRS changes its ratings methods 
when it becomes an NRSRO.  These tests are more descriptive in nature, and any 
interpretation of these results is more speculative.  Yet we report these results to provide a 
more complete description of the impact of this event.  After becoming an NRSRO, DBRS 
expands its market presence and rates more U.S. issuers.  Moreover, before becoming an 
NRSRO, DBRS focused on the high-grade market.  After, they increased their emphasis on 
speculative-grade firms and seem to have begun rating a wider array of firms, just as the 
incumbent NRSROs do.    
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We also find that DBRS ratings become more highly correlated with the ratings of the other 
NRSROs after February 2003.  This ratings convergence occurs because the relationship 
between issue size and lagged yields and the DBRS rating shifts.  Prior to becoming an 
NRSRO, large issues and bonds with a relatively high yield were more likely to be rated 
better by DBRS than the other agencies.  This effect disappears after DBRS becomes an 
NRSRO.  Also, when we control for the effect of size and yields, the ratings convergence 
result disappears.  DBRS seems to have rated large and higher-yield firms more generously, 
perhaps trying to win market share.  After February 2003, this incentive may have been 
dominated by the incentive to provide more credible ratings. 
  
Our study extends recent papers testing how ratings affect bond yields.  Kliger and Sarig 
(2000) use a similar quasi-natural experiment approach to test how information from ratings 
affects yields.  They compare bond yields before and after Moody’s added modifiers in April 
1982, increasing the fineness of their ratings measure (e.g., an A-rated firm then became an 
A1, A2 or A3 rated firm).  They find that the change in information content decreased yields 
of bonds rated at the high end of the scale relative to bonds rated at the low end.  Our study 
complements theirs.  Like Kliger and Sarig (2000), we exploit a natural experiment, but our 
set-up varies the regulatory status of the rating agency holding information constant, exactly 
the reverse of their empirical design.  Consistent with our study, Bongaerts, Cremers and 
Goetzmann (2008) find that Fitch ratings - the third NRSRO – matter mainly for regulatory 
reasons.  While they are not able to exploit a natural experiment, they find that firms are more 
likely to have a Fitch rating when S&P and Moody’s are on opposite sides of the investment 
grade margin, and that a positive Fitch rating only comes with lower yields for bonds near   5 
 
investment grade.  Taken together, these studies indicate that ratings affect a firm’s cost of 
capital for both information and regulatory reasons.
1 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section I we establish the main hypothesis 
of the paper and provide institutional details regarding rating regulations.  In Section II we 
discuss the contribution of the paper relative to existing literature.  In Section III we provide 
the empirical tests of the paper.  In Section IV we conclude. 
 
I.  Hypothesis Development and Institutional Background 
 
I. A. Ratings-Based Regulations and Debt Cost of Capital 
 
The cost of debt capital for a firm is fundamentally determined by the risk free cost of capital 
and a spread due to estimated default risk.  If the supply of debt capital from investors is 
infinitely elastic at the correct rate of interest, regulatory restrictions for certain investors on 
bond investment should not affect a firm’s cost of capital.  However, if the supply of capital is 
not infinitely elastic, regulations which affect the cost to investors of investing in a particular 
bond class or restrictions placed on investors in certain bonds may affect a firm’s cost of 
                                                 
1 Our study also generally relates to previous literature which examines the information content of ratings, and 
whether ratings affect financing and investment decisions.  Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) find 
statistically significant negative average excess bond and stock returns upon the announcement of bond rating 
downgrades.  Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts (1987) and West (1973) find that credit ratings are significant 
predictors of yield to maturity.  Ederington and Goh (1998) show that credit rating downgrades result in negative 
equity returns.   Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Sufi (2009) find that having a rating increases a firm’s 
leverage (and they conclude this is due to increased access to capital).  Kisgen (2006 and 2009) finds that credit 
ratings affect firm capital structure decisions. 
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capital.
2  For example, yields on bonds with higher regulatory costs will be higher to compete 
with bonds that have lower regulatory costs, ceteris paribus.  By affecting a firm’s cost of 
capital, these regulations may materially affect a firm’s financing and investment decisions. 
 
Many investment rules and regulations are based on a bond’s credit rating as provided by 
rating agencies.  Regulations based on credit ratings began as early as 1931, when banks were 
required to mark-to-market lower rated bonds.  In 1936, the U.S. Treasury Department then 
issued a ruling that banks could not invest in securities that are “distinctly and predominantly 
speculative” according to a “designated standard” which must be “supported by not less than 
two rating manuals.”  Following this, banks went through a significant reorganization with the 
ultimate result being an increase in spreads between BBB rated and BB rated bonds.  In 1989, 
Savings and Loans were prohibited from investing in junk bonds such that they could not hold 
any junk bonds by 1994.  In 1993, the Basle Committee on Bank Supervision proposed in its 
market risk guidelines that internationally active commercial banks dealing in securities 
should hold extra capital against their non investment-grade bond inventories as well. 
 
Insurance company investment is also affected by regulations based on ratings.  In 1951, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) established the Securities 
Valuation Office (SVO) to assign risk ratings to bonds held in the investment portfolios of 
insurance companies.  These risk ratings are largely determined using credit ratings, whereby 
the SVO assigns 6 quality ratings that correspond to the ratings of the major agencies.  Firms 
that are rated A or above get a value of 1, firms that are BBB get a value of 2, BB get a 3, B a 
                                                 
2 Restrictions on investment might also affect a bond’s liquidity, which would affect its cost of capital even if the 
supply curve was infinitely elastic. Regulations affect firm disclosure as well; in 1982, the SEC allowed less 
detailed disclosure requirements for issuers of investment grade securities relative to non-investment grade.     7 
 
4, any C level gets a 5, and any D rating gets a 6.  The insurance company’s capital 
requirements are determined by these ratings, thus higher capital requirements are imposed on 
insurers when their portfolios contain bonds with lower ratings, so the riskier securities are 
more expensive for insurance companies to own.  At this time, the NAIC began equating the 
term “investment grade” to bonds with a Baa-rating or better.  Investment grade bonds were 
therefore bonds with a rating of Baa or BBB or higher by Moody’s or S&P’s, respectively, 
and junk (or high-yield) bonds are those with rating of Ba or BB or lower by Moody’s or 
S&P’s, respectively.  In 1990, the NAIC further tightened guidelines for junk bond 
investment by life insurance companies. 
 
Several additional institutions are affected by regulations based on ratings.  SEC Rule 2a-7 
states that money market mutual funds are required to limit investments in bonds rated less 
than A+, and commercial paper rated less than A1 (see Kisgen (2007)).  In 1975, the SEC 
adopted Rule 15c3-1 that set forth broker-dealer haircut requirements that were a function of 
the credit ratings of those securities.  Through this rule, the SEC applied a net capital rule 
whereby credit ratings became the basis for determining the percentage reduction in the value 
(“haircut”) of bonds owned by broker-dealers for the purpose of calculating their capital 
requirements.  Many trustees use credit ratings to give guidelines to fund managers as well.  
Pension funds also often place limits on the amount of a portfolio that can be invested in junk 
bonds, and in 1988 the Department of Labor instituted a regulation permitting pension fund 
investment in asset-backed securities only rated A or better.  Investment grade bond mutual 
funds can only hold up to 5% of assets in non-investment grade bonds but must sell any 
security if it falls below a B rating.  The Eurobond and Asset Backed Securities markets often 
require a certain rating for a firm to participate in that market.  California state regulations   8 
 
prohibit California-incorporated insurance companies from investing in bonds rated below 
single-A.  In this paper, we investigate whether these extensive rules and regulations affect a 
firm’s cost of capital. 
 
I. B.  Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs) 
 
The regulations discussed in the previous section are all based on credit ratings.  Without 
further clarification for which rating agency’s ratings could be used for these regulations, 
arbitrary firms could be established to provide specious “ratings” to circumvent the effects of 
these regulations.  Recognizing this issue, in 1975 the SEC designated certain ratings agencies 
as "nationally recognized statistical rating organizations" (NRSROs), which indicated that 
they are qualified for use in regulations.  The three existing rating agencies at the time — 
Moody's, S&P, and Fitch — were immediately "grandfathered" into the NRSRO category.  
Consequently, only NRSRO ratings were valid for the determination of broker-dealers' capital 
requirements, and then bank and insurance company regulators adopted the NRSRO 
distinction, as did other financial regulators.  The SEC then decided to use it again for money 
market mutual funds regulations.   The SEC acknowledges, “Although we originated the use 
of the term NRSRO for a narrow purpose in our own regulations, ratings by NRSROs today 
are used widely as benchmarks in federal and state legislation, rules issued by other financial 
regulators, in the United States and abroad, and private financial contracts.” (SEC, 2003) 
 
A rating agency must apply to the SEC to obtain NRSRO status.  The NRSRO process has 
been criticized for a lack of transparency regarding the qualifications and process of obtaining 
NRSRO status and for perhaps inefficiently limiting the number of certified rating agencies,   9 
 
thereby stifling competition.  Firms that were rejected for NRSRO status complained that the 
process was unfair and stifled competition.  The SEC did not originally provide a statement of 
the qualifications for being designated as an NRSRO, and in 1997, when the agency proposed 
regulations that would define an NRSRO, it did not enact final regulations.  The primary 
guidance for whether a firm would qualify was that the firm should be “nationally 
recognized” in the United States and be an issuer of “credible and reliable ratings”.  From 
1975 to 2000, the SEC designated only four additional firms as NRSROs, but several mergers 
led to the number of NRSROs reverting to the original three (Moody's, S&P, and Fitch) by 
2000.  This changed however in 2003, when the SEC granted DBRS NRSRO status, which is 
the basis for our study. 
 
The Credit Rating Reform Act of 2006 subsequently required the SEC to establish clearer 
guidelines for which firms would qualify for NRSRO status (see Cantor and Packer (1994) 
and White (2007)).  Since then, five additional firms have been granted NRSRO status: Japan 
Credit Rating Agency, Ltd., Ratings and Investment Information, Inc., LACE Financial, 
Realpoint LLC, and Egan-Jones Ratings Company.  The total of NRSROs as of January 2009 
was ten (A.M. Best, a rating agency primarily focused on the insurance industry, was granted 
NRSRO status in 2005).  The SEC continues to consider the implications of the designation, 
and with recent regulations, has tried to minimize the impact of ratings.  Our study speaks 
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II. Credit Rating Literature and Relative Contribution 
 
Significant literature examines the information content of ratings.  Credit ratings might impact 
a firm’s bond yields if they provide non-public information regarding a firm’s probability of 
default.  Rating agencies may receive significant sensitive information from firms that is not 
public, as firms may be reluctant to provide information publicly that would compromise their 
strategic programs, in particular with regard to competitors.  Credit agencies might also 
specialize in the information gathering and evaluating process and thereby provide more 
reliable measures of the firm’s creditworthiness.  Regulation FD also excludes rating 
agencies, such that rating agencies continue to be allowed to receive non-public information. 
 
The literature examining the information content of ratings is comprised of three main 
approaches: tests examining the relationship between the level of a firm’s bond yield and 
ratings, tests examining the relationship between changes in yields and changes in ratings, and 
tests utilizing a natural experiment to identify the impact of ratings on bond yields.  These 
studies typically do not make a distinction between regulatory versus information based 
explanations for the impact on yields, although most emphasize the information aspect.  For 
example, Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) find statistically significant negative average 
excess bond and stock returns upon the announcement of downgrades of straight debt.  
Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts (1987) and West (1973) find that credit ratings are significant 
predictors of yield to maturity beyond the information contained in publicly available 
financial variables and other factors that would predict spreads.  Ederington and Goh (1998) 
show that credit rating downgrades result in negative equity returns and that equity analysts 
tend to revise earnings forecasts “sharply downward” following the downgrade.  They further   11 
 
conclude that this action is a result of the “downgrade itself – not to earlier negative 
information or contemporaneous earnings numbers.”
3  Becker and Milbourn (2009) examine 
the change in ratings quality when Fitch decides to rate a firm, in addition to Moody’s and 
S&P.  Kliger and Sarig (2000) rely on a natural experiment to examine the informational 
impact of ratings on yields.  In April 1982, Moody’s added modifiers to their ratings, 
increasing the fineness of their ratings measure (e.g., an A-rated firm then became an A1, A2 
or A3 rated firm).  This represents an exogenous change in the information provided by 
Moody’s ratings, holding its regulatory status constant.  Kliger and Sarig (2000) find that this 
change impacts bond yields in the direction implied by the modification.  Tang (2009) extends 
this work by relying on the same event for additional tests. 
 
Other papers examine the impact of ratings on the supply of debt capital.  Faulkender and 
Petersen (2006) and Sufi (2009) find that firms with bond or bank-loan ratings issue more 
debt or have more leverage.  Since firms choose to be rated, Faulkender and Peterson (2006) 
use instrumental variables for the existence of a bond rating for identification.  Sufi (2009) 
relies on firm fixed effects and control variables for identification.  Our study differs from 
these studies by looking at the regulatory impact of different levels of ratings instead of the 
impact of having rating, we look at the impact on yields not leverage, and we rely on a natural 
experiment for identification.  Our study also pinpoints the direct impact of regulations, 
whereas these other studies examine general supply of capital effects.   
 
                                                 
3 Cantor and Packer (1997) also show that the average credit rating is more correlated with yields than that of 
either agency alone, while Morgan (2002) shows that hard-to-value firms such as banks (especially trading 
banks) are more likely to receive a split rating than other firms.   12 
 
Finally, recent literature also focuses on the impact of ratings on corporate leverage.  Kisgen 
(2006) finds that firm near a change in credit rating are more likely to undertake leverage 
reducing activity.  Kisgen (2009) finds that after a firm is downgraded, a firm is more likely to 
reduce leverage, presumably to regain a previous rating target.  These effects are shown to be 
stronger at the investment grade cutoff, and also stronger for firms which see downgrades in 
their commercial paper ratings, both of which are consistent with the significance of 
regulations.  To the extent that we find that regulations based on ratings affect a firm’s cost of 
capital, this paper provides justification for the corporate behavior documented in this 
previous work.   
 
Our contribution lies fundamentally with our empirical design which allows us to identify 
specifically the regulatory impact of ratings.  The change in regulatory status of DBRS should 
have no impact on the information content of DBRS ratings that were assigned prior to DBRS 
receiving that status.  Even after DBRS received NRSRO status, the information impact of the 
change in status should be small.  DBRS might be able to obtain better access to firms after 
receiving DBRS certification from the SEC, but it is unclear to what extent that would 
manifest.  Our empirical tests also rely on the ratings prior to February 2003 to examine this 
affect, so the identification issues raised in Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Sufi (2009) and 
Becker and Milbourn (2009) are mitigated.  Our study is the first to document that regulations 




   13 
 
III. Empirical Results 
 
III.A. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
Bond ratings and yield data come from Bloomberg from 2001-2005.  We obtain a firm’s 
DBRS, S&P, Moody’s and Fitch ratings, and the yields on its bonds for each month.  The 
sample is constrained to include only non-financial firms with a DBRS rating where we can 
observe monthly bond yields.  For the main empirical tests of the paper, the sample is further 
constrained to include only bonds rated by DBRS as of January 2003, one month prior to their 
winning NRSRO status.  This sub-sample consists of 42 firms and 90 bonds (when a firm has 
multiple bonds, we include all of them and then cluster standard errors by firm).  We merge 
these observations to Compustat to obtain firm specific information, such as size and 
leverage. 
 
Tables 1-3 report summary statistics for the sample of firms rated by DBRS.  Table 1 reports 
the number of issuers and bonds in each year of our sample from 2001-2005, as well as the 
distribution across rating bins.  Notably, DBRS increases its market share considerably after 
2003, gains access to the U.S. market, and expands across to whole spectrum of the ratings 
distribution.  For example, in 2001 almost 90% of their business focused on Canadian issuers.  
By 2005 this share had fallen to about 50%.  After obtaining NRSRO status, the number of 
firms rated by DBRS increases from 46 in 2002 to 165 in 2005 (the total number of firms 
actually rated by DBRS is higher, since we place restrictions for inclusion in our sample).  
The distribution of firms rated by DBRS also changes significantly after they obtain NRSRO 
status.  Of the firms rated by DBRS, 27.1% have a BB or BBB rating prior to February 2003,   14 
 
compared to 48.8% for S&P.  After becoming and NRSRO, 46.7% of DBRS’s newly rated 
issuers have a BB or BBB rating, compared to 52.8% for S%P.  Thus, DBRS chooses to rate 
more low-quality firms and more firms near the investment grade distinction after becoming 
an NRSRO. 
 
Table 2 reports statistics on the bonds rated by DBRS, Moody’s and S&P.  Since Moody’s 
and S&P rate virtually all bonds, this sample is effectively the sample of firms rated by DBRS 
that we can identify in Bloomberg.  The mean rating for bonds rated by DBRS increases after 
DBRS becomes an NRSRO, indicating that DBRS rates on average lower quality issuers after 
obtaining NRSRO status (a bond’s rating is cardinalized for these tables, such that a AAA 
bond is coded with a value of 1, AA+ is 2, etc.).  DBRS also appears to rate firms somewhat 
more favorably than the other rating agencies at all times, and that propensity increases 
slightly after NRSRO status.  However, as we see below, this relationship may reflect some 
omitted characteristic of a bond which DBRS merely weights differently from the other 
agencies. 
 
Table 3 compares characteristics of firms rated by DBRS versus the sample of firms rated by 
S&P, using Compustat data.  DBRS-rated firms are about three times larger than the average 
of firms rated by S&P.  DBRS also rates a disproportionate number of mining and 
construction firms, which reflects its Canadian headquarters.  No significant differences exist 
for leverage or the percentage of tangible assets for firms rated by DBRS compared to those 
rated by S&P. 
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III.B. Main Tests 
 
Table 4 reports results from the first main tests of the paper (columns 1 & 2).  We test the 
following cross-sectional regressions for each of the ten months after DBRS obtains NRSRO 
status.  The months, T, range from March to December 2003. 
 
(YieldT – YieldJan2003)i = α+ β1*(DBRS-Mean Rating)Jan2003,i + εi    (1) 
 
For each test, the dependent variable is the yield on a firm’s bond for the indicated month 
minus its yield on January 2003, the month prior to DBRS obtaining NRSRO status.  The 
intercept in (1) controls for changes in bond spreads between month T and January of 2003.  
The explanatory variable equals the bond’s DBRS rating as of January 2003 minus the mean 
rating from Moody’s and S&P as of January 2003.
4  Our identification strategy is designed to 
focus solely on the regulatory effects on yields, so the dependent variable captures the change 
in the mean NRSRO rating (including DBRS) that occurs only because of the change in 
DBRS’s status.  If DBRS rates a bond the same as the other agencies, then becoming an 
NRSRO has no impact on the average rating the bond receives (and our explanatory variable 
equals 0).  If DBRS differs from the other agencies, however, then a firm’s average NRSRO 
rating will change as a result of the change in DBRS’s regulatory status.  Since we hold the 
ratings constant at their predetermined level (January 2003), the variable captures the change 
in a firm’s average NRSRO rating that occurs solely because of the change in DBRS’s status.   
 
                                                 
4 We report our results using the average of Moody’s and S&P because almost all of our bonds are rated by both 
of the two major NRSROs.  In contrast, only 5 of the 90 bonds are rated by Fitch.  We have, however, also 
estimated equation (1) using the average across all three of the NRSRO when the Fitch rating is available and the 
results are very similar to those reported here.   See Table 7 and the description below. 
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Any information provided by a firm’s rating in January 2003 should be incorporated in the 
yield as of January of 2003.
5  Each cross-sectional test includes bonds for the 42 firms with 
DBRS ratings as of January 2003.  If DBRS ratings affect a firm’s cost of capital once DBRS 
obtains NRSRO status, we expect β1 to be greater than 0, implying a better DBRS rating leads 
to lower yields and a worse rating leads to a higher yield.  The null hypothesis is that the 
regulatory status of DBRS is not important for a firm’s cost of capital, implying β1=0. 
 
The results indicate that the difference in a bond’s DBRS rating from the other agencies 
significantly affects its yield once DBRS obtains NRSRO status (Table 4).  By December 
2003, yields change by 16 basis points per ratings-notch difference between DBRS and the 
other agencies.
6  Given the structure of the empirical design, it’s difficult to explain this 
change in yield with anything other than this particular event.  This change in yield however 
is not immediate.  For example, three months after DBRS obtains NRSRO status, the yield 
change is only 5 basis points, and not statistically distinguishable from zero.  The gradual 
increase in magnitude makes sense given the regulatory explanation for these results, and 
given the relative illiquidity of the corporate bond market.  Investors may not immediately 
adjust to the change in regulatory status of NRSRO, and therefore the full effect is 
incorporated slowly as investors modify their portfolios.  An information-based explanation 
would imply a more immediate impact on yields. 
 
                                                 
5 A change in the NRSRO rating stemming from an increase or decrease in default risk for a bond could also be 
correlated with yield changes.  As a robustness test, we have also estimated equation (1) controlling for this 
effect by adding the change in the mean NRSRO rating between month T and January 2003.  This variable does 
not enter the regression with a significant coefficient, and the effect of the pre-existing DBRS rating remains 
economically and statistically significant.  See Table 7 and the description below. 
 
6 Although we have clustered at the issuer level, we have also estimated the model using issuer-level averaged 
data with non-clustered, robust standard errors (so N=42 rather than 90).  In this model the point estimate 
increases from 16 to 27 basis points at the 10-month horizon, with a T-statistic of 2.52 (from 2.17).   17 
 
Table 4 also reports our falsification tests (columns 3-6).  We incorrectly pretend that a 
change in regulatory status occurs in February of 2004 or February of 2005, and re-estimate 
equation (1).  The sample for each test includes all DBRS-rated firms as of January of the 
particular year.  These tests do not generate the same results.  The difference in rating 
between DBRS and the other agencies has no impact on yields after these artificial event 
dates.  These tests reinforce that the previous results are unique to February 2003, the month 
that DBRS was awarded NRSRO status. 
 
III.C.  Regulation, not certification 
 
So far we have established that the change in regulatory status strengthened the market impact 
of the DBRS rating.  Is that due to regulatory effects of ratings, or SEC certification of 
DBRS?  Market participants might view ratings from DBRS as more credible signals of 
default risk because of a rigorous SEC vetting process.  The remaining tests of this section are 
designed to clarify whether these results are indeed specific to ratings-based regulations.  
 
In Table 5, we examine whether the yield impact is larger when the DBRS rates a firm more 
favorably versus when it rates a firm worse.  If the change in yield identified in Table 4 is due 
to certification, DBRS ratings should become uniformly more informative after February 
2003.  This additional information content would thus affect yields symmetrically, decreasing 
yields when DBRS rates better and increasing them when they rate worse.  The regulatory 
channel predicts a significant asymmetry in the yield effect, however, because most 
regulations depend on a minimum rating from one (or sometimes two) NRSRO.  For example, 
if Moody’s and S&P rate a firm investment grade already, a non-investment grade rating from   18 
 
DBRS should have little regulatory impact.  On the other hand, if Moody’s rates a firm 
investment grade and S&P does not, then an investment grade rating from DBRS could 
significantly expand the pool of investors willing to hold these bonds and thus lower the yield.  
To examine this implication, we extend the model above, as follows: 
 
(YieldT – YieldJan)i = α+ β2*Better* (DBRS-Mean Rating)Jan,i + β3*Worse*(DBRS-Mean 
Rating)Jan,i + εi          (2) 
 
This test is identical to the test of equation (1) except for the introduction of the dummy 
variables Better and Worse.  Better equals one if the DBRS rates a firm better than the mean 
rating of the other agencies; Worse equals one if the DBRS rates a firm worse.  If the DBRS 
rating is equal to the mean rating of the other agencies, the value of “DBRS-Mean Rating” is 
zero and thus the Better and Worse dummies are not live variables.  The regulatory 
explanation implies that the coefficient on β2 is greater than zero and that β2 > β3.  The 
certification explanation implies that both β2 and β3 are both greater than zero (and equal to 
each other). 
 
The results of Table 5 indicate a significantly higher impact on yields from a DBRS rating 
that is better than the mean rating than if it is worse.  A one notch better rating from DBRS 
implies a 39 basis point reduction in a firm’s debt cost of capital by December 2003.  The 
relative difference between a better DBRS rating versus a worse DBRS rating is 42 basis 
points (39-(-3)).  The hypothesis that β2 and β3 are equal is rejected at the 1% level in all 
months six months or later than the event date.  Furthermore, the impact on yields from a 
worse DBRS rating is insignificant in all months (in month seven it is ‘significant’ but in the   19 
 
wrong direction).  The evidence in this table strongly support the notion that ratings-based 
regulations affect a firm’s cost of capital. 
 
In Table 6, we examine whether the impact on yields from DBRS becoming an NRSRO is 
larger for firms rated near the investment-grade/speculative-grade cutoff.  Many of the 
regulations outlined in Section I are concentrated or are more severe if a firm’s rating is below 
investment grade.  Therefore, a firm near the investment grade margin can benefit more from 
the change in DBRS’s status than a firm that is very highly rated (A or above), or very poorly 
rated (B or worse).  Having DBRS rate better than the other NRSROs accrues large benefits to 
firms near an upgrade to investment grade or to those near a downgrade to speculative grade.  
To examine these firms, we create a dummy variable, “Near Investment Grade”, which equals 
one if the firm is rated BBB or BB (Kisgen (2006) uses a similar measure)).  If regulations are 
insignificant for a firm’s cost of capital, we would expect to see no incremental difference for 
this group of firms.  We interact the DBRS relative rating with a “Near Investment Grade” 
dummy variable to test if its effects are larger for these marginal firms. 
 
Table 6 shows that the effects are concentrated among firms near investment grade when 
DBRS rates better than the other agencies.  The magnitude is both statistically and 
economically significant, with nearly a 55 basis point reduction in yields for firms with a 
better DBRS rating that are near the investment grade distinction (and a 16 basis point decline 
for better firms that are away from the investment grade margin).  The large magnitude of the 
estimated effect presumably reflects the high spread between the investment grade and 
speculative grade markets during our sample, which averaged about 250 basis points in 2003 
(BBB v. BB).  Some caution should also be taken with the interpretation of these results, since   20 
 
the subsample of firms near the investment grade cutoff with a DBRS rating which is better 
than the average rating of other rating agencies is only 9 firms (and 15 bonds).  The evidence 
nevertheless underscores the importance of regulations for a firm’s cost of capital. 
 
III.D.  Robustness Tests 
 
Table 7 reports three robustness tests.  Each column has one cross-sectional regression, 
inverting the presentation format relative to Tables 4-6.  Column 1 reports the benchmark 
regression for comparison (the model in the last row of Table 6), and the subsequent columns 
report the robustness tests.  All of these regressions are based on the cross-sectional regression 
at the 10-month horizon.  First, we redefine the relative rating variable using the all three 
NRSROs - Moody’s, S&P and Fitch – to define the mean NRSRO (column 2).  Second, we 
introduce four control variables: the initial (January 2003) mean NRSRO rating, the change in 
the mean NRSRO rating (December - January), the log of the size of the bond, and an 
indicator for Canadian issuers (column 3).  Third, we change the dependent variable from the 
absolute yield change to the percentage change in yield, with and without the four new control 
variables (columns 4 & 5). 
  Our results remain similar across all three robustness tests.  Introducing the Fitch 
rating has very little impact because only 5 bonds are affected by this change; if anything the 
results get slightly stronger.  Introducing the four control variables strengthens the effect of 
the DBRS rating for the firms near the investment-grade margin (slightly) and weakens the 
effect for the other bonds (again only slightly).  Adding the initial level of the rating controls 
for the possibility that spreads within the corporate bond market changed; adding the change 
in the mean NRSRO rating controls for the possibility that some of the yields change due to   21 
 
changes in credit quality; adding the log of issue size controls for the possibility that larger 
issues experienced a change in yields compared to smaller issues; and adding the Canadian 
indicator controls for the possibility that Canadian firms experienced yield changes relative to 
American issuers.  In fact, we do find significance on both the initial rating and the Canadian 
indicator (R
2 rises to about 50%), but adding these controls has very little effect on our main 
result. 
 
III.E. Does DBRS change it ratings methods? 
 
In Table 8 we test whether DBRS changes the way it rates bonds.  For these tests, we use the 
sample of bonds rated by DBRS prior to becoming an NRSRO (columns 1-3), and we then 
expand the sample to include all DBRS-rated bonds before and after February 2003 (columns 
4-6).  By including all bonds, we lose the clean identification of the tests of the previous 
section.  However, including them allows us to examine the behavior of DBRS before and 
after they receive NRSRO status.  While causality is hard to sort out in these tests, we report 
them to paint a more complete picture of this event. 
 
The dependent variable for the tests in Table 8 equals the DBRS rating in a particular bond-
month.  We order the ratings from 1 (AAA) to 2 (AA+) all the way up to 20 (CC).  We report 
both fixed effects OLS regressions (columns 1 and 4), and, since there are no natural units for 
credit ratings, ordered Logits.  The independent variables are bond or issuer characteristics, 
measured one month prior to the month for the DBRS rating.  These variables include the 
mean rating issued by S&P and Moody’s (measured on the same numerical scale), the log of 
the issue size, the yield of the issue, an indicator for whether the bond was issued by a   22 
 
Canadian firm, an indicator for bonds near the investment grade cutoff, and an indicator for 
whether the time period was after DBRS receives NRSRO status.  The yield of the issue and 
the rating of the issue are of course correlated; moreover, it is difficult to sort out the causality 
between yields and ratings because ratings changes both lead and lag yield changes.  Hence 
we report results with and without the yield. 
 
The first and fourth columns of Table 8 reports the stripped down OLS model with bond fixed 
effects, the mean rating by the longstanding NRSROs, a post-NRSRO indicator, and their 
interaction.  A coefficient of one on the mean rating variable suggests that DBRS follows 
rating changes by the other agencies one-for-one.  The actual coefficient of 0.52 (0.56 with all 
bonds) indicates that changes in ratings are significantly related for DBRS compared to other 
firms, but that DBRS also makes changes independent from the other agencies.  The 
coefficient on the mean rating variable interacted with the Post-NRSRO indicator is positive 
and significant, meaning that changes in ratings from DBRS become more tightly linked to 
those of the other NRSROs after February 2003.  So, DBRS converges toward the other 
NRSROs after their change in status. 
 
Next, we drop the bond fixed effects and replace them with bond characteristics to help 
identify why DBRS diverges from the other agencies.  We report ordered Logits, which are 
estimable (and preferred to OLS) in the absence of the fixed effects.  DBRS tends to provide a 
more favorable rating to large issues prior to gaining NRSRO status, but this preference falls 
in the post-NRSRO period.  In the sample with all bonds, the sum of the direct and interaction 
terms is not statistically significant, suggesting that there is no impact of issue size after 
DBRS becomes an NRSRO.  (Since the model conditions on the other NRSRO ratings, the   23 
 
result means that DBRS does not place greater weight on size than the other agencies.)  DBRS 
also seems to provide Canadian issuers more favorable ratings in both periods.  We find no 
evidence that DBRS rates firms near the investment grade cutoff more favorably, either 
before or after becoming an NRSRO.  Having shown that DBRS rates more firms near the 
investment grade cutoff in the post period, one might expect that they would also 
systematically provide them with better ratings.  This does not appear to be the case.  We 
conclude that although there is more demand for DBRS ratings from firms near the 
investment grade cutoff, DBRS maintains its objectivity when rating them. 
 
In columns 3 and 6, we add the bond yield to the models.  Prior to February 2003, firms with 
higher bond yields receive better ratings from DBRS, controlling for the firm’s rating from 
the other agencies.  This result could reflect demand from firms who believe their bond yields 
do not reflect fundamentals, and who therefore seek another rating.  Or, DBRS may market 
their services to firms whose ratings appear too conservative.  Regardless, it suggests a 
contrarian style prior to NRSRO status.  In the post NRSRO period, this relationship 
disappears completely.  The coefficient on the yield interacted with the post period (0.69) 





We have shown that regulations constraining bond investment affect yields and thus firms’ 
cost of capital.  Our strategy exploits a quasi-natural experiment: in February 2003, the SEC 
deemed DBRS a ‘Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization’.  Ratings granted by   24 
 
such NRSROs are used to determine capital requirements for holders of bonds such as 
insurance companies, banks and broker-dealers.  Moreover, some investors will not hold 
bonds unless they are rated investment grade by one or more of the NRSROs.  We find that 
bond yields fall for firms that DBRS rates more favorably than the other NRSROs after the 
SEC’s decision.  The decline shows up asymmetrically. There is no increase in yields for 
bonds that DBRS rates relatively unfavorably.  Moreover, the effects are larger around the 
investment-grade cutoff, where the effects of regulatory constraints are most binding.  Hence, 
we conclude that bond regulations affect yields.  The result suggests that simple tradeoff 
theories, where firm balance financial distress costs against tax benefits, are too simple.  Our 
results imply, for example, that a firm losing its investment grade would suffer a larger 
increase in its cost of capital than would be expected solely from the implied increase in 
probability of distress. 
 
We also provide some descriptive evidence about DBRS’ ratings methods before and after 
becoming an NRSRO.  These results are harder to interpret causally, particularly correlations 
between ratings and yields.  Nevertheless, the data suggest that DBRS rates bonds more like 
the other major agencies after becoming an NRSRO.  In 2006 Congress passed legislation 
improving the transparency and lowering the cost of becoming an NRSRO.  Five new 
agencies have recently become NRSROs, raising the total number to nine from three less than 
ten years ago.  This change in structure may radically alter the incentive of these agencies, 
especially because, as we have shown, ratings granted by them can change firms’ cost of 
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2001 314 57 32 87%
2002 818 113 46 78%
2003 1,534 235 73 71%
2004 3,878 541 119 57%
2005 8,224 877 165 51%
Total 14,768 1,823 435









AAA 5.8% 1.1% 3.4% 7.1% 0.9%
AA 7.7% 4.7% 4.0% 5.4% 3.9%
A 59.5% 20.3% 49.2% 38.3% 18.3%
BBB 26.9% 28.4% 43.4% 36.6% 30.1%
BB 0.2% 20.4% 0.0% 10.1% 22.7%
B 0.0% 18.5% 0.0% 2.4% 19.9%
CCC and worse 0.0% 6.6% 0.0% 0.2% 4.2%
After NRSRO
Table 1: Sample Description
This table reports the number of observations over time for which we can observe the DBRS rating, the yield on the bond and the average rating by the other three 








Yield to Maturity (%) 6.43 0.96 5.23 1.07 0.00
Fraction rated the same by all agencies 73.0% - 64.0% - 0.66
Absolute rating difference (Best - Worst) 0.30 0.53 0.52 0.83 0.44
Mean Rating (S&P, Moody's & Fitch) - 1 means AAA, 2 means AA, … 6.29 2.30 6.92 3.12 0.02
DBRS rating - Mean Rating -0.17 1.04 -0.25 0.84 0.08
1 The p-value tests the null that the mean in the two periods is the same.  The statistic is built controlling for bond-level fixed effects and clustering the data by issuer.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Before DBRS became an NRSRO 
(N=1,226)
After DBRS became an NRSRO 
(N=13,542)





Leverage (total liabilities / book assets) 0.68 0.14 0.69 0.20
Asset size (MM $s) 21.5 40.5 7.3 18.9
PP&E / assets 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Share mining & construction (SIC = 1) 16.7% - 6.0% -
Share manufacturing (SIC = 2 or 3) 29.2% - 42.9% -
Share regulated (SIC = 4) 46.4% - 26.4% -
Table 3: DBRS Sample v. Other S&P Rated Compustat Firms
This table reports simple summary statistics for Compustat firms with a DBRS ratings and an S&P-rated with S&P-rated Compustat firms that were not 
rated by DBRS.  Neither sample contains financial companies (SIC = 6).
DBRS Rated S&P RatedDBRS-Mean rating, 










One-month after NRSRO (March) -0.04 89 -0.01 208 0.01 497
(0.96) 0.03 (0.83) 0.01 (0.03) 0.01
Two-months after NRSRO (April) 0.02 89 -0.01 202 -0.11 494
(1.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (1.71) 0.04
Three-months after NRSRO (May) 0.03 90 -0.01 208 -0.08 499
(1.04) 0.01 (0.33) 0.01 (1.60) 0.02
Four-months after NRSRO (June) 0.05 90 -0.03 206 -0.03 495
(1.21) 0.03 (0.69) 0.01 (0.79) 0.01
Five-months after NRSRO (July) 0.05 90 -0.01 204 -0.01 491
(1.00) 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.07) 0.01
Six-months after NRSRO (August) 0.07 86 -0.05 201 -0.02 495
(1.44) 0.04 (1.41) 0.03 (0.36) 0.01
Seven-months after NRSRO (September) 0.09 86 -0.04 200 -0.01 495
(1.44) 0.07 (0.97) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01
Eight-months after NRSRO (October) 0.11 85 -0.03 206 -0.03 499
(1.70) 0.08 (0.85) 0.01 (0.44) 0.01
Nine-months after NRSRO (November) 0.14 85 -0.05 206 -0.03 493
(2.34) 0.13 (1.18) 0.02 (0.42) 0.01
Ten-months after NRSRO (December) 0.16 89 -0.05 206 -0.03 499
(2.17) 0.13 (1.00) 0.02 (0.37) 0.01
2004 2005 2003
Falsification Tests
Year in which DBRS becomes an 
NRSRO
Each row in this table represents three cross-sectional regressions.  We report regressions of the change in the yield to maturity on bonds after January 2003, the month before the SEC 
deemed DBRS and NRSRO in columns 1 & 2, controlling for the difference between the DBRS rating and the average rating (from Moody's and S&P) as of January 2003.  Each regression 
includes an intercept which is not reported.  The regressions in columns 3 & 4 and 5 & 6 report the same cross sectional models and act as a falsification test because there was no change in 
DBRS's regulatory status during these years.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses based on residuals clustered by firm (since some firms issue more than one bond).
Table 4: Cost of capital falls when DBRS becomes an NRSROsDBRS-Mean rating 
if DBRS rates 
better
DBRS-Mean 




N              
(R 2)
(1) (2)
One-month after NRSRO -0.12 0.02 0.26 89
(1.21) (0.71) 0.06
Two-months after NRSRO 0.01 0.03 0.86 89
(0.22) (0.83) 0.01
Three-months after NRSRO 0.10 -0.03 0.17 90
(1.43) (0.81) 0.04
Four-months after NRSRO 0.17 -0.04 0.04 90
(2.07) (1.41) 0.08
Five-months after NRSRO 0.19 -0.06 0.03 90
(2.25) (1.65) 0.08
Six-months after NRSRO 0.21 -0.05 0.01 86
(2.80) (1.50) 0.12
Seven-months after NRSRO 0.27 -0.06 0.00 86
(3.16) (2.18) 0.17
Eight-months after NRSRO 0.28 -0.03 0.01 85
(2.73) (0.93) 0.15
Nine-months after NRSRO 0.30 0.01 0.02 85
(2.89) (0.32) 0.19
Ten-months after NRSRO 0.39 -0.03 0.00 89
(3.72) (0.76) 0.24
Table 5: Cost of capital falls when DBRS only for firm rated better
Each row in this table represents one cross-sectional regression.  We report regressions of the change in the yield to maturity on bonds after January 
2003, the month before the SEC deemed DBRS and NRSRO.  We control for the difference between the DBRS rating and the average rating (from 
Moody's and S&P) as of January 2003.  Each regression includes an intercept which is not reported.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses based on 
residuals clustered by firm (since some firms issue more than one bond).Near Investment 
Grade
DBRS-Mean 
rating if DBRS 
rates better
DBRS-Mean 




Mean rating if 
DBRS rates better
N              
(R 2)
One-month after NRSRO -0.35 0.02 -0.04 -0.30 89
(4.32) (0.33) (1.43) (2.16) 0.21
Two-months after NRSRO -0.35 0.07 -0.03 -0.17 89
(3.49) (1.17) (1.06) (1.80) 0.22
Three-months after NRSRO -0.27 0.11 -0.07 -0.06 90
(2.63) (1.31) (2.06) (0.51) 0.15
Four-months after NRSRO -0.20 0.09 -0.07 0.09 90
(1.75) (1.07) (2.21) (0.69) 0.19
Five-months after NRSRO 0.14 0.08 -0.03 0.20 90
(0.85) (1.05) (1.00) (1.34) 0.10
Six-months after NRSRO 0.14 0.07 -0.01 0.25 86
(1.14) (0.97) (0.42) (1.85) 0.16
Seven-months after NRSRO 0.02 0.10 -0.06 0.28 86
(0.14) (1.42) (1.89) (2.20) 0.25
Eight-months after NRSRO -0.07 0.08 -0.03 0.30 85
(0.41) (1.04) (1.00) (2.04) 0.25
Nine-months after NRSRO -0.07 0.11 0.01 0.30 85
(0.49) (1.57) (0.49) (2.18) 0.29
Ten-months after NRSRO -0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.37 89
(0.01) (2.28) (0.31) (2.65) 0.32
Each row in this table represents one cross-sectional regression.  We report regressions of the change in the yield to maturity on bonds after January 2003, the month 
before the SEC deemed DBRS and NRSRO.  We control for the difference between the DBRS rating and the average rating (from Moody's and S&P) as of January 2003.  
Each regression includes an intercept which is not reported.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses based on residuals clustered by firm (since some firms issue more than
one bond).
Table 6: Cost of Capital Falls Most for Near Investment-grade FirmsBaseline model: 





Near Investment Grade Indicator -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.002 -0.006
(0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.20)
DBRS-Mean rating if DBRS rates better 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.024 0.015
(2.28) (2.32) (0.97) (1.97) (0.83)
DBRS-Mean rating if DBRS rates worse -0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.007 0.000
(0.31) (0.39) (0.81) (1.29) (0.01)
Near Investment Grade * DBRS-Mean rating if DBRS rates better 0.37 0.43 0.42 0.055 0.061
(2.65) (2.59) (2.52) (2.36) (2.27)
Mean level of rating as of January 2003 - - -0.04 - -0.005
- - (2.27) - (1.69)
Change in rating, January to December 2003 - - -0.11 - -0.007
- - (0.74) - (0.29)
Log of Issue Size - - 0.01 - 0.000
- - (0.37) - (0.04)
Indicator for Canadian issuers - - -0.61 - -0.108
- - (3.23) - (3.39)
N 89 89 86 89 86
R2 0.32 0.32 0.50 0.26 0.43
Log of Yield Change
Table 7: Robustness Tests
Each column in this table represents one cross-sectional regression, where the dependent variable measures the change in the yield from January 2003 to December 
2003.  We control for the difference between the DBRS rating and the average rating (from Moody's and S&P) as of January 2002.  Each regression includes an intercept 
which is not reported.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses based on residuals clustered by firm (since some firms issue more than one bond).Mean Rating (S&P & Moody's) - 1 means AAA, 2 means AA, … 0.52 2.07 2.20 0.56 2.31 2.42
(2.46) (6.72) (7.22) (3.58) (8.01) (8.68)
Log of Issue Size - -0.93 -0.90 - -0.98 -0.94
- (3.81) (4.09) - (4.45) (4.76)
Indicator for Canadian Issuers - -1.37 -1.23 - -1.33 -1.15
- (1.78) (1.76) - (1.83) (1.76)
Indicator for Bonds near Investment Grade - 0.13 0.17 - -0.67 -0.58
- (0.22) (0.27) - (1.07) (0.92)
Bond Yield - - (0.66) - - -0.75
- - (2.62) - - (3.12)
Indicator for DBRS Post NRSRO -0.49 -1.48 -4.60 -0.50 -4.65 -8.29
(2.52) (1.54) (3.51) (2.50) (2.71) (4.34)
Mean Rating * Post NRSRO 0.07 0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.01 -0.08
(2.82) (0.41) (0.18) (2.74) (0.03) (0.52)
Log of Issue Size * Post NRSRO - 0.20 0.18 - 0.71 0.68
- (1.53) (1.54) - (2.33) (2.18)
Indicator for Canadian Issuers * Post NRSRO - -0.23 -0.40 - 0.75 0.57
- (0.32) (0.58) - (0.99) (0.83)
Indicator for Bonds near Investment Grade * Post NRSRO - -0.02 -0.11 - 0.32 0.21
- (0.04) (0.15) - (0.52) (0.36)
Bond Yield * Post NRSRO - - 0.60 - - 0.69
- - (2.46) - - (2.60)
P-value for Chi
2-test that Issue size coefficient = 0 after NRSRO - 0.00 0.00 - 0.36 0.36
P-value for Chi
2-test that Bond Yield coefficient = 0 after NRSRO - - 0.73 - - 0.62
Estimation Method Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS
N
R
2 (within for fixed effects OLS, pseudo for ordered logit) 0.38 0.48 0.48 0.41 0.55 0.55
Table 8: Regression of DBRS ratting relative to rating by other NRSROs, including lagged bond Yield
Table reports regressions of the DBRS rating on the average rating by Moody's and S&P and issue characteristics.  Each rating is converted into a number (e.g. AAA=1, AA=2, etc), so an 
increase in the dependent variable means DBRS rates the firm worse.  All of the regressors are measured as of the preceding month.  We report each model with OLS and also using an 
ordered logit.  Also, we report the model for all of our data and for the subset of bond rated by DBRS both before and after the change in their status.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
based on residuals clustered by firm (since some firms issue more than one bond).
Ordered Logit Ordered Logit
Only Bonds issued and rated by DBRS before DBRS 
became an NRSRO All Bonds
4,270 14,058